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Abstract 
In games with multiple equilibria, the fairest equilibrium –in case one exists- may be the 
obvious solution for some players but not for others, and players can be aware of this 
heterogeneity. This paper theoretically explores how coordination could be achieved in this 
case. The model is consistent with abundant experimental evidence and explains, for instance, 
why (a) the attractiveness of the fair equilibrium, (b) out-of-equilibrium payoffs, (c) dominated 
strategies, and (d) the number of players and available strategies matter for coordination. The 
model is compared with alternative equilibrium selection criteria like risk and payoff 
dominance and ideas for new experiments are suggested. 
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1. Introduction 
Coordination becomes crucial when a group of agents have a common goal and there 
are different ways to achieve it. Anyone who has written a paper with a coauthor knows this 
well. Other examples include deciding where and when we meet somebody, selecting an 
industry standard, or organizing teamwork and division of labor –for a dramatic example in this 
line, think of a squad who must occupy a position of the enemy: A single deviation from the 
plan of attack can involve the utter failure of the operation, or significantly increase the number 
of casualties. 
How do people coordinate? Game theorists often view a coordination problem as a 
game with multiple Nash equilibria: The players must coordinate or ‘select’ a particular 
equilibrium.1 In this line, Schelling (1960) introduced the concept of focal point meaning by 
that any equilibrium that is ‘prominent’ or ‘obvious’ for reasons like precedence and symmetry; 
and argued that such prominence helps players to synchronize their expectations on their co-
players’ behavior. In this view, players coordinate if it is common knowledge that the game has 
a unique focal equilibrium. 
In addition, Harsanyi and Selten (1988) propose two focal principles, or qualities that 
make an equilibrium focal: Payoff dominance -see also Gauthier (1975)- and risk dominance –
consult Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p. 355-357) for a motivation. Equilibrium s is payoff 
dominant if players receive strictly higher payoffs at s than at any other equilibrium, while it is 
risk-dominant (in 2x2 games with two pure strategy equilibria) if it maximizes the product of 
players’ losses from unilateral deviation. 
However appealing the logic behind these two principles can be, some experimental 
evidence is at odds with them: Subjects sometimes fail to coordinate on the payoff dominant or 
the risk dominant equilibria –Cooper et al. (1990), Van Huyck et al. (1990), Straub (1995), 
Haruvy and Stahl (2007).  
With this in mind, this paper proposes an alternative focal principle, based on one 
simple idea: Any equilibrium that attains a just or fair outcome is prominent or focal.2  To 
explore the empirical relevance of this intuition, we follow an incremental design. Thus, section 
2 offers a toy model that applies on normal-form games and is based on the hypothesis that all 
                                                 
1 In fact, the term coordination game sometimes refers to a game with several equilibria, a usage 
that we follow throughout this paper. There is apparently no convention on this, though. Thus, 
Schelling (1960) uses this expression to mean any game with multiple equilibria, all them yielding 
identical payoffs; and Cooper et al. (1990) to refer to games which exhibit multiple Nash equilibria 
which are Pareto-rankable.  
2 In this paper, we use the terms ‘distributive justice’ and ‘fairness’ indistinguishably. The word 
fairness, in particular, does not refer exclusively to equity.  
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agents agree on their distributive judgments, represented by a social welfare function (SWF). 
This implies that players should coordinate on the unique ‘fair equilibrium’, in case one exists. 
To test this prediction, we consider alternative SWFs and conclude that a Paretian and 
symmetric SWF combining efficiency and equity (the E-SWF) fits the available experimental 
data comparatively well –Myerson (1997, p. 112) note too that “welfare properties of equity 
and efficiency may determine the focal equilibrium in a game” (italics in the original). 
This toy model makes two remarkable predictions. First, the symmetry of the E-SWF 
implies that a game will not have a unique focal point (implicitly indicating that coordination is 
uncertain) when equilibrium payoff vectors are permutations of each other. Game 1 provides an 
illustration, as both (row, column) equilibrium allocations (5, 3) and (3, 5) are fair according to 
the E-SWF. Second, in a game with multiple surplus-preserving equilibria, players should 
coordinate on the most equitable one –e.g., in equilibrium (E, E) of Game 2. Yet the model is 
incoherent with a widely replicated experimental phenomenon: Variations in out of equilibrium 
payoffs often affect coordination. Thus, Schmidt et al. (2003) report a significantly higher rate 
of choice of action A in Game 3 than in Game 4 –see also Cooper et al. (1990), and Straub 
(1995). 
 
 E1 E2 
E1 5, 3 0, 0 
E2 0, 0 3, 5 
E A 
E 5, 5 0, 0 
A 0, 0 9, 1 
 
 
 
 
Game 1: Battle of the Sexes                                                   Game 2 
 
  E A 
E 10, 10 2, 8 
A 8, 2 8, 8 
E A 
E 10, 10 6, 8 
A 8, 6 8, 8 
 
 
 
                             Game 3                                                                 Game 4 
The fact that subjects often choose A in Game 3 seems to indicate that they doubt that 
others will play E. This leads us to reconsider the hypothesis of a common focal point, which is 
arguably unrealistic in our context: People do not always coincide on what they deem fair, or 
simply some people do not find obvious at all a fair equilibrium.3  In view of this, section 3 
introduces heterogeneous focal points. More precisely, we posit that some players find obvious 
                                                 
3 There seems to be few controlled evidence on this issue. However, abundant evidence indicates 
that people have heterogeneous social attitudes and preferences -consult Camerer (2003) or Fehr 
and Schmidt (2006) for surveys. 
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any ‘E-equilibrium’ leading to an allocation maximizing the E-SWF, while others do not regard 
fairness a focal principle.   
Consider then a normal-form game with a unique E-equilibrium s, like Games 2, 3, and 
4. If people differ beforehand on what they consider a prominent solution, how do they 
coordinate on s? We conjecture that the existence of a sufficiently large mass of E-types will be 
a sufficient condition for success. More precisely, we posit s to be focal for all players if the 
proportion of E-types is so large that no deviation from s is profitable when the E-players 
follow s, even if the non-E-types were to uniformly deviate from s. To put it like that, the E-
equilibrium is obvious for everybody if there exists a critical mass of E-types that makes play 
of s not risky. We call this hypothesis the E-principle. 
 One can think of at least two stories behind this selection principle. First, it might be 
common knowledge that the E-types go always for the E-equilibrium if they believe to be 
numerous enough, with the result that the remaining group of people who do not find s obvious 
are ‘forced’ to play s, and hence everybody coordinates on s -this has strong similarities with 
the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Second, and though our model posits 
equilibrium behavior, it is also tempting to see the E-principle as related to recent theories of 
bounded rationality that assume that people have different depths of reasoning –see Camerer 
(2003, pp. 242-259) for a good discussion on these models. 
For example, Stahl and Wilson (1995) assume that due to insufficient reason some 
players choose with uniform probability among their strategies (level-0 rationality), while level-
k players best respond to level-(k-1) choices. From their experimental data they estimate 
roughly equal numbers of level-0 and level-1 agents, an insignificant fraction of level-2 
subjects, and significant proportions of variously sophisticated Nash types. Along these lines, 
one might think of the E-types as sophisticated Nash agents who believe that non-E-types are 
basically level-0 players, and who play the E-equilibrium for sure if they are numerous 
enough.4  
We offer in section 3 a number of testable predictions. Thus, the more attractive the E-
equilibrium is, the easier it is to coordinate on it –e.g., consider a game identical to Game 4 
except that both players get 1000 if they play (E, E). The model also predicts that out of 
equilibrium payoffs (even if they correspond to dominated strategies) and the sheer number of 
players and available strategies may affect coordination on the E-equilibrium. In addition, the 
minimal mass of E-types required to make focal the E-equilibrium s of a game can be used as a 
                                                 
4 While we find this interpretation instructive, it is imperative to keep in mind the differences 
between our model and any model of bounded rationality. To put it like that, our model aims to 
explain towards which equilibrium play will converge, not the evolution of play.  
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measure of how difficult it is to coordinate on s on that game, and thus elaborate a ranking of 
games. In general, the model provides numerous ideas for new experiments –e.g., it suggests 
studying more thoroughly asymmetric games where a conflict between equity and efficiency 
exists.5
Section 3 also compares the E-principle to some alternative focal principles, and we 
judge it to be relatively more consistent with the evidence here analyzed. Thus, payoff 
dominance is at odds with the fact that out of equilibrium payoffs influence coordination, and 
some experimental evidence –Straub (1995), Haruvy and Stahl (2007)- attests that subjects 
need not always coordinate on the risk dominant equilibrium, in particular if it does not 
coincide with the E-equilibrium. 
To sum up, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a toy model assuming a 
common focal point and considers its limitations. In section 3 we introduce heterogeneous focal 
points, explore its behavioral predictions, and show this expanded model to be consistent with 
much experimental evidence. Finally, section 4 concludes by mentioning some possible 
extensions. 
2. A Toy Model: Homogeneous Players 
Consider any two-player, normal-form game. Let a = (ar, ac) denote a pure strategy 
profile where the row player r moves ar and the column player c chooses ac, x(a) = [xr(a), 
xc(a)] denote its associated vector of monetary payoffs, and N={r, c} denote the set of players. 
To keep the model as simple as possible, we posit that both players are egoist and risk-neutral 
so that their utility function is  (i )()( axau ii = ∈  N). 
In addition, we assume that the game has a finite number of pure strategy Nash 
equilibria and introduce a continuous social welfare function (SWF) . Under these 
conditions, there is at least one equilibrium a* such that x(a*) maximizes W* among all pure 
equilibria of the game.
ℜ→ℜ2:*W
6 We call any such a* a W*-focal equilibrium and assume 
Hypothesis 1: If the game has a unique W*-focal equilibrium, players follow it.  
One possible interpretation of this hypothesis is that players agree on their distributional 
value judgments (represented by W*), and that they deem obvious any equilibrium leading to 
what, according to their view, constitutes the fairest possible outcome. We say that players 
coordinate if the game has a unique W*-focal equilibrium. Otherwise we simply contend that 
the model is undetermined (implicitly meaning that coordination failure might occur). 
2.1 Testing the Model for Different Social Welfare Functions W*   
                                                 
5 Much experimental analysis to date has focused on symmetric coordination games. 
6 We focus for parsimony on pure strategies though formal definitions allow for mixed ones.  
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How empirically relevant is this toy model? Answering this question requires being 
precise about the SWF W* -if we were very vague on this, any behavior could be consistent 
with the model and hence it would not be falsable. The problem of course is that one can think 
of infinite continuous SWFs. However, Konow (2003) review abundant empirical evidence on 
impartial fairness preferences, and conclude that people’s views on fairness often integrate 
three principles (efficiency, or maximizing the surplus; equity, based on proportionality; and 
need, or equal satisfaction of basic needs). For this reason, but also for parsimony, we 
conjecture that a reasonable W* should linearly combine the utilitarian, maximin and 
egalitarian7 SWFs, respectively: 
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 To informally explore which linear combination has the largest explanatory power, we 
start by considering the most parsimonious candidates, that is, the very SWFs (1) to (3). In this 
regard, we note first that the available evidence is at odds with the assumption that W* is the 
utilitarian or the maximin SWFs. To illustrate this point, consider Game 5 (the so-called Stag 
Hunt game), where . This game has two equilibria in pure strategies, that is (E, E) 
and (S, S), but only (E, E) leads to a Pareto efficient outcome. For this reason, the toy model 
predicts that all players should choose E if W* were the utilitarian or the maximin SWF (or any 
linear combination of them).
0>> ba
8  
However, and as the experimental evidence from Cooper et al. (1992), Straub (1995), 
and Clark et al. (2001) attests, subjects often fail to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. In 
the experiment by Cooper et al. (1992), for instance, subjects played a Stag Hunt game twenty 
times with random, anonymous re-matching, and the reported data from the last eleven periods 
shows that of the 330 total plays only 5 were of the efficient strategy. 
                                                 
7 By computing the payoff distance between the worst-off and the best-off players, the egalitarian 
SWF provides a crude measure of the inequality embodied in distribution x. This function is not 
differentiable at some points, but that does not seem to pose a big problem, at least for the games 
we analyze. Of course, one may think of alternative, more sophisticated SWFs on this line. 
8 In contrast, the model would be undetermined if W* were the egalitarian SWF, as any pure strategy 
equilibria leads to an egalitarian allocation. 
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E S 
E a , a 0, b 
S b, 0 b, b 
E B 
E a , a 0, 0  
B 0, 0 b, b 
       
 
 
     Game 5: The Stag Hunt Game                        Game 6 
Why do subjects deviate from the efficient equilibrium? To think more about this 
problem it is worthy to analyze Game 6, which is identical to Stag Hunt (hence, a > b > 0) 
except that out-of-equilibrium payoffs are all zero. As Stag Hunt, Game 6 has two Pareto-
ranked pure strategy equilibria –i.e., (E, E) and (B, B)-, of which only (E, E) is focal according 
to the utilitarian SWF or the maximin SWF. Therefore, both players should play E if W* were 
any of those SWFs (or a combination of them). 
Is this prediction right? Van Huyck et al. (1992) use a game similar to Game 6 –the only 
difference was that players had available three strategies and there were accordingly three 
(Pareto ranked) equilibria- and report that 97 percent of the subjects played the socially 
efficient equilibrium. Apparently, therefore, out of equilibrium payoffs are the reason why 
subjects deviate from the efficient equilibrium in the Stag Hunt. Clearly, the toy model cannot 
account for this phenomenon, whatever the SWF we choose. Note incidentally that neither can 
the payoff dominance criterion proposed by Gauthier (1975) and Harsanyi and Selten (1988). 
The utilitarian SWF (and the payoff dominance criterion too) presents another problem. 
To illustrate it, consider the so-called Nash bargaining game: Two players simultaneously 
demand some amount of money between $0 and, say, $10 and their respective demands are 
satisfied if they add up to $10 or less, while both players get $0 otherwise. Any division of the 
ten dollars is clearly a surplus-preserving Nash equilibrium, so that our model is undetermined 
if W* is the utilitarian SWF. However, the evidence from Roth and Malouf (1979) indicates 
that the egalitarian sharing (5, 5) has a prominence that makes it the obvious solution. In 
addition, 82 percent of the participants in one game in Van Huyck et al. (1992) played the 
equilibrium yielding equal payoffs (5, 5) instead of two other equilibria yielding payoffs (7, 3) 
and (3, 7), respectively. 
This problem of the utilitarian SWF leads us naturally to consider the egalitarian SWF. 
Nonetheless, this SWF also appears to have important problems in explaining coordination. To 
start, the toy model predicts coordination on equilibrium (B, B) in Game 7 because (10, 50) is 
the most egalitarian equilibrium outcome. However, the evidence from Straub (1995) is clearly 
at odds with that prediction. In this experiment, 10 subjects played this game 9 times with 
anonymous re-matching, and the author reports that most subjects played E most (if not all) of 
the time. 
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E B 
E 90, 40 0, 0 
B 0, 0 10, 50 
E A 
E 100, 80 0, 0 
A 0, 0 1, 1 
 E B 
E 100, 100 1,0 
B 0, 1 25, 25 
 
 
 
 
                       Game 7                                     Game 8                                           Game 9 
Apparently, the most equitable equilibrium is not necessarily the focal one. To further 
pursue this point, consider Game 8. The toy model predicts coordination on equilibrium (A, A) 
if W* is the egalitarian SWF. Nevertheless, introspection indicates that (E, E) is much more 
likely. Incidentally, this problem is likely to be shared by any other W* that, as the egalitarian 
SWF, is not increasing –i.e., by any SWF that does not satisfy the Paretian property, which 
entails two conditions: (a) If )(*)'(*' uWuWiuu ií ≥⇒∀≥ , and (b) if  
. In addition, the assumption that equality makes an 
equilibrium focal implies that the toy model is undetermined in Game 9 -both (E, E) and (B, B) 
lead to an equal outcome. That seems a rather poor forecast, though, at least when compared 
with the prediction that players coordinate on (E, E) if W* is the utilitarian or the maximin 
SWF.         
)(*)'(*' uWuWiuu ií >⇒∀>
The previous discussion apparently suggests that an equitable equilibrium is focal when 
it is socially efficient as well (as in the Nash bargaining game), but not otherwise. This insight 
leads us to consider a linear combination of the SWFs (1) and (3), the efficiency-equity (E) SWF 
( 10 << δ ): 
                                                   (4) }){max}{min ()( i
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i
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i
E xxxxW
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The interpretation of hypothesis 10 << δ  is that, when evaluating the fairness of 
different payoff vectors, players weight social efficiency more heavily than equality –as a 
result, function (4) is a strictly Paretian SWF so that any payoff-dominant equilibrium payoff 
vector maximizes it. 
Consistent with the available evidence from the lab, the E-SWF predicts coordination on 
the surplus-maximizing outcome of Games 6 and 7 (and on the egalitarian equilibrium of the 
Nash Bargaining game). Furthermore, it shares the reasonable predictions of the utilitarian 
SWF in Games 8 and 9 and, although it cannot explain why out of equilibrium payoffs affect 
coordination, we have seen that this problem afflicts any SWF in our simple model. 
 For all these reasons, we find the E-SWF a particularly appealing choice. Of course, 
one might think of other sensible alternatives, like a linear combination of the utilitarian and the 
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maximin SWFs.9 Nevertheless, in two-player games this latter SWF makes the same 
predictions as the E-SWF, and we have scant lab evidence from multi-player, one shot, 
coordination games in which equity and maximin conflict. Game 10 is an extremely simple 
illustration of this class of games: Three players (Row, Column and Dummy) are involved but 
only Row and Column are active, while Dummy has no say –in each cell, Dummy’s payoff is 
the right-hand one. 
 M E 
M (60, 15, 15) (0, 0, 0) 
E (0, 0, 0) (40, 40, 10)
                             Game 10: A conflict between maximin and equity  
Observe that (60, 15, 15) is W*-focal according to any SWF that linearly combines the 
utilitarian and maximin SWFs, while (40, 40, 10) is focal according to the E-SWF –note that 
both allocations are surplus-preserving. Hence, players should coordinate on the equilibrium 
(M, M) if they find focal the first SWF and on equilibrium (E, E) if they find focal the E-SWF. 
Controlled experimental evidence on this line would be welcome. 
2.2 Symmetric Social Welfare Functions: Some implications 
It is worthy to remark that all examples of W* that we have considered up to now 
satisfy the property of symmetry, that is, W*(x) = W*(x’) if the entries of payoff vector x 
constitute a permutation of the entries of vector x’. This means that in evaluating the fairness of 
an outcome, all agents are on the same footing. Since most of us probably regard impartiality as 
a minimal requirement on any justice theory –Barry (1995)-, we find symmetry a reasonable 
property, at least in one-shot games played by anonymous subjects, as is usual in many 
experiments.  
To reflect on the consequences of choosing a symmetric W*, consider any game with at 
least two equilibrium payoff vectors x, x’ that constitute a permutation of each other and 
maximize W*. Clearly, the toy model does not select a unique equilibrium and hence it is 
undetermined here. We understand this multiplicity of predictions as a signal that real players 
may fail to coordinate, something that appears to be consistent with the available experimental 
data. 
As an illustration, consider the ‘Battle of the Sexes’ (BOS) Game 11, where . 
This game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies –i.e., (E1, E1) and (E2, E2)- and since the 
associated equilibrium payoff vectors are permutations of each other, the toy model is clearly 
undetermined if W* is symmetric. Consistent with this indeterminacy, Cooper et al. (1989) and 
0>> ba
                                                 
9 In view of the experimental evidence shown by Konow (2003), one could also think of a more 
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Straub (1995) report experimental evidence from this game and show that subjects often fail to 
coordinate on any pure strategy equilibrium. Although rather erratic, behavior roughly matches 
the mixed strategy equilibrium prediction as subjects tend to choose their preferred move with 
the highest probability. Interestingly, however, Straub (1995) make clear that his results fail to 
replicate those from Cooper et al (1989) –in fact, Straub ran two sessions with different subjects 
but an identical BOS, and reported significantly different results from session to session. 
 
 E1 E2 
E1 ba  ,  0,0  
E2 0,0  ab ,  
 E1 E2 
E1 aa ,  0,0  
E2 0,0  aa ,  
 
 
 
 
             Game 11: The Battle of the Sexes                             Game 12: Matching game 
Game 12 ( ) provides further illustration. This is an example of a matching game -
Camerer 2003, p. 341- because all equilibria have the same payoffs for each player. As its two 
pure strategy equilibria are W*-focal according to any symmetric SWF, it follows that the toy 
model is again undetermined. According to the model, therefore, coordination fails in BOS and 
matching games for the same reason: The lack of a unique E-equilibrium or, in other words, a 
unique ‘fair manner’ to play the game. This is in contrast with an alternative argument 
sometimes given to explain coordination failures in BOS, that is, that subjects have in general 
doubts about which one deserves the better outcome. We do not believe this to be right, though, 
as it is at odds with the above mentioned evidence from Game 7: Apparently, subjects have no 
doubt about which player deserves the better outcome if there is clearly a fair outcome. 
0>a
Incidentally, we would like to stress that players may have available other focal points 
in matching games or BOS so that coordination need not be simply a matter of luck. Alternative 
focal principles include precedence, the strategies’ labels, the uniqueness of a certain physical 
property, etc. For instance, 89 percent of the participants in one experiment reported in Mehta, 
Starmer and Sugden (1994) coordinated on Mt. Everest when choosing from a large set of 
mountains in a matching game.  
This raises an interesting question: Do subjects attach preference to any particular focal 
principle when some of them collide? For instance, consider a game in which two Chinese 
players simultaneously choose between ‘Mt. Everest’ or ‘Mt. Teide’ (the highest elevation in 
Spain), and such that each player earns $5 if they coordinate on ‘Mt. Everest’, $10 if they 
coordinate on ‘Mt. Teide’, and no money otherwise. Clearly, the choice ‘Teide’ stands from the 
distributive point of view, whereas ‘Everest’ stands for cultural reasons. 
                                                                                                                                                           
complex SWF including social efficiency, equity, and the maximin concern as ingredients.  
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As another example, participants in one of the treatments of Van Huyck et al. (1992) 
were recommended (‘assigned’, in the authors’ terminology) some equilibrium in a game 
similar to our Game 6. When the payoff-dominant equilibrium was recommended, subjects 
unanimously played it; however, when the payoff-dominated equilibrium was assigned, less 
than half of the subjects played it. This suggests that, as a focal point, fairness is more 
‘prominent’ than assignments, at least for a majority of the subjects. 
2.3 Conclusions 
On one hand, the hypothesis that W* is symmetric and depends on both efficiency and 
equity produces two appealing predictions: (a) Coordination is uncertain if the equilibrium 
outcomes are permutations of each other, and (b) both the social surplus and payoff disparity 
matter for coordination. On the other hand, the toy model fails to explain why out of 
equilibrium payoffs affect coordination. In order to account for this, the following section 
extends the model while keeping the E-SWF as a key ingredient. 
3. Extending the Model: Heterogeneous Agents 
We hence relax the hypothesis of homogeneity, positing instead that players have 
heterogeneous views on what they consider a focal equilibrium and that, moreover, each player 
is uncertain about each other player’s view. For this, we assume that players play a Bayesian 
game. That is, prior to the start of the game, players’ types are assumed to be drawn from some 
objective distribution over a finite set }W..,,W,{WW K21=  of K continuous and symmetric 
social welfare functions. More precisely, and to simplify the analysis, we consider only two 
types (the model can be extended to more complex cases): 
Hypothesis 2: The type of a proportion ρ of the players is the E-SWF ( 10 << δ ) 
                                                   (4) }){max}{min ()( i
Ni
iNiNi
i
E xxxxW
∈∈∈
−+= ∑ δ
Remaining players’ type is the ‘constant’ SWF: ? ).()( ℜ∈= CCxW C
Intuitively, players whose type is the constant SWF do find all equilibria outcomes 
equally prominent. For them, therefore, fairness does not play any role in equilibrium selection. 
On the contrary, an equilibrium outcome is prominent for the other players (the E-types) if it 
maximizes the E-SWF.10 Any -focal equilibrium of a game will be called an E-equilibrium 
hereafter. 
EW
If ρ = 1 the model collapses to the toy model plus the assumption that W* is the E-
SWF. In this case, players follow the E-equilibrium in case only one exists. To analyze the case 
                                                 
10 Note well that types do not differ in their utility function (both are risk neutral and selfish) but in 
their beliefs about what a prominent equilibrium is. In fact, one could depict the ideas of the model 
without making reference to Bayesian games, but at the cost, we believe, of expositional clarity.  
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ρ < 1, consider any game with a unique E-equilibrium ),( EcErE aaa = , and let  denote the 
number of pure strategies available to player i, and ai’ denote any non-dominated pure strategy 
different than  (i = {r, c}). Given this, we define threshold 
im
Eia [ ]1,0∈Erρ  as the minimum ρ  
such that any Erρρ ≥  satisfies 
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In other words, when Erρρ ≥  the row player does not find optimal to deviate from Era  
if she expects the column player to choose  if he is an E-type and any pure strategy 
different than  with equal probability if he is not an E-type. The computation of 
Eca
Eca Erρ , which 
obviously takes a specific value in each game, is greatly simplified by noting that the optimal 
ar’ in the right-hand side of (5) has necessarily to be a best response to  among all 
strategies different than 
Eca
Era , since it must maximize the right-hand side of (5) in particular 
when ρ = 1.11  The column player’s threshold Ecρ  is analogously defined and is equal to Erρ  
if the game is symmetric. In turn, we define Eρ  as { }0,,max EcEr ρρ . Note that Eρ  
always exists since we allow for the possibility that Eρ  = 1. This concept leads to the 
following 
Hypothesis 3 (the E-Focal Principle): In games with a unique E-equilibrium, players 
follow it if Eρρ ≥ .12 No focal equilibrium exists otherwise. 
The model can be easily applied to two-player coordination games with 2x2 matrices, 
like the one at Table 1. To make this a coordination game with just one E-equilibrium, assume 
without loss of generality that (E, E) and (NE, NE) are the only pure strategy equilibria and that 
(E, E) is the E-equilibrium. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Since ar’ is restricted to be pure, there is always such an optimal deviation. With mixed strategies, 
in contrast, an optimum need not exist –the problem is that a deviation may become more profitable 
as the mixture gets closer to ; game 16 of Haruvy and Stahl (2007) is an example of this.     Eia
12 This hypothesis is silent about games like BOS, matching games or indeed any game with multiple 
E-equilibria. Implicitly, the model is undetermined here.  
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 E NE 
E 1111 , ba  1212 , ba  
NE 2121 , ba  2222 , ba  
                                              Table 1: A 2 x 2 Payoff Matrix  
One can show that Eρ  coincides in this game with the highest possible probability that 
a player chooses the E-action in the mixed strategy equilibrium. In effect, application of 
equation (5) to Table 1 gives us the following value for Erρ : 
                      22211211 )1()1( aaaa ⋅−+⋅≥⋅−+⋅ ρρρρ
                               Eraaaa
aa ρρ =−+−
−≥⇔
21111222
1222 ,                                               (6) 
that is, equal to the probability that the row player chooses E in the mixed strategy 
equilibrium of the game. In addition, an analogous argument shows that the threshold prior for 
the column player is 
                               Ecbbbb
bb ρ=−+−
−
12112122
2122 .                                                         (7) 
Since Eρ  coincides by definition with the maximum of (6) and (7), this proves our prior 
statement. As an illustration, direct application of equations (6) and (7) confirm that Eρ  is 
equal to b/ a in the Stag Hunt Game 5 and to b/(a + b) in Game 6. 
Inspection of (6) and (7) provide one key insight. Recall that hypothesis 3 says that 
players will play E for sure if the proportion of E-types is larger than Eρ . For this reason, 
coordination on the E-equilibrium should become easier as thresholds (6) and (7) decrease. In 
this regard, partial derivation demonstrates that Erρ  increases with  and and 
decreases with  and  -an analogous pattern holds for 
22a 21a
11a 12a Ecρ . Therefore, both equilibrium 
and out of equilibrium payoffs are crucial to ensure coordination.  
We believe that this insight is supported by much experimental evidence. To start, it 
might explain why subjects coordinate on the E-equilibrium of Game 6 much more frequently 
than in the Stag Hunt Game 5 –we have just seen that the threshold associated to Game 6 is 
smaller than that of Game 5. As further favoring evidence, Straub (1995) study Games 13 and 
14 (points indicate the probability of earning $2), and report changes in efficient play in a 
direction coherent with our model. Different cohorts of subjects played each game 9 rounds and 
while play converged to (E, E) in Game 13, it converged to equilibrium (NE, NE) in Game 14. 
Observe that ρ  should be at least equal to 0.5 and 0.75 for players to coordinate on (E, E) in 
Game 13 and 14, respectively –see also Battalio et al. (2001) and Schmidt et al. (2003) for 
similar results.  
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In addition, Straub (1995) studies a variant of Game 14 where and  were equal 
to 0 instead of 20, and reports convergence to equilibrium (NE, NE) –according to our model, 
12a 21b
ρ  should be at least equal to 0.8 to ensure coordination on (E, E). Interestingly, among the 6 
games with a unique E-equilibrium that Straub analyzed, players coordinated on the E-
equilibrium only in those games which had a threshold prior Eρ  smaller or equal than 2/3. 
  
E NE 
E 100, 100 20, 60
NE 60, 20 60, 60
E NE 
E 100, 100 20, 80 
NE 80, 20 80, 80 
 
 
 
 
                                  Game 13                                                       Game 14 
In another multi-game study, Haruvy and Stahl (2007) consider 14 symmetric, 3x3 
payoff matrices with two or three Pareto-ranked equilibria. Remarkably, the E-equilibrium was 
played by the majority of the subjects only in those games where the critical mass Eρ  was 
smaller or equal than 0.27. In other words, our model correctly partitions the set of 14 games 
between one subset where players coordinate (on the E-equilibrium) and one subset where 
players do not. Nevertheless, the limit number 0.27 contrasts with the aforementioned limit of 
2/3 from Straub (1995).13
As we noted, equilibrium payoffs (both non-E and E-equilibrium ones) should also 
influence coordination. More precisely, our model makes the following testable prediction: 
Ceteris paribus, coordination on the E-equilibrium of Table 1 becomes easier as its associated 
surplus (or attractiveness)  increases. To illustrate this point, consider a variant of 
Game 14 where are both equal to 1000 instead of 100: It seems intuitive that 
coordination is more likely in the former case. Analogously, the less attractive the non-E-
equilibrium is, the easier is to coordinate on the E-equilibrium. 
1111 ba +
1111 , ba
There is some controlled evidence on this specific issue, although we also find that 
additional study could be worthwhile. Brandts and Cooper (2007) study coordination in a class 
of games more complex than the ones we consider here and observe a higher level of 
                                                 
13 Subjects in Haruvy and Stahl (2007) were encouraged to use calculators in the main treatment 
and, as the results from a control treatment indicated, this feature induced more level-1 choices and 
reduced significantly the play of the E-equilibrium in most of the games analyzed. Further, the payoff 
matrices that subjects viewed in their screens displayed only their own payoffs. The games being 
symmetric, this should be inconsequential for our model, but maybe it attenuated the prominence of 
any equilibrium in terms of fairness. We speculate that these two factors reduced notably subjects’ 
beliefs about ρ , thus explaining the quantitative discrepancy between both studies. 
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coordination on the E-equilibrium as it becomes more attractive.14 In turn, Schmidt et al. (2003) 
consider an array of symmetric 2x2 games with a unique payoff dominant equilibrium and 
different values of what they call payoff dominance measure -if the game at Table 1 is 
supposed to be symmetric, this measure is computed as the ratio P= 
11
2211
a
aa − . However, no 
pair of games in their study differed only in the attractiveness of the E-equilibrium. 
It is worthy to remark in this regard that our model predicts that ceteris paribus an 
increase in P should facilitate coordination on the E-equilibrium, because either decreasing 
or increasing  should foster coordination. In contrast, Schmidt et al (2003) claim from 
their results that changes in the level of P do not affect significantly subjects’ play. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear from our point of view what drove their results because they 
simultaneously changed out of equilibrium payoffs. In our view, more experimental evidence 
on this issue is required. 
22a 11a
To finish, note well that hypothesis 3 selects the E-equilibrium as the obvious solution 
only if the mass of E-players is ‘large enough’. For instance, the model unequivocally predicts 
that Stag Hunt players will move E if a is sufficiently larger than b, (this is one way to rephrase 
the above mentioned condition Eab ρρ =≥ / ) but it is undetermined otherwise. We interpret 
this indetermination as a signal that players may fail to coordinate and that multiple outcomes 
are possible. Consistent with this, different experimental studies report different rates of 
efficient play when a and b are ‘close enough’. In Cooper et al. (1992), payoffs (b =800; a 
=1000) were given in points that determined the probability of the player winning a lottery 
where winning players received $1 and losing players received $0 -thus, a and b were arguably 
close. The reported data shows that play of the inefficient equilibrium was prevalent –Clark et 
al. (2001) replicate this result. In contrast, Duffy and Feltovich (2002) show much larger levels 
of efficient play even when they used a similar payoff calibration and binary lottery procedure. 
Moreover, they report a large variance in the three sessions that they ran: In two of them, the 
frequency of efficient play was close to 50%, while in the other one it was 81%. 
3.1 How the E-principle compares with Other Focal Principles 
It may be instructive to compare our equilibrium refinement with others that have been 
proposed in the literature. For instance, Harsanyi and Selten (1988) propose risk dominance and 
payoff dominance. To recall, equilibrium s is payoff dominant if players receive higher payoffs 
at s than at any other equilibrium, while it is risk-dominant if it maximizes the product of the 
losses from unilateral deviation –this definition specifically applies to 2x2 payoff matrices with 
two pure equilibria; for a more general definition, see Haruvy and Stahl (2007). In the Stag 
                                                 
14 They also observe that communication is more efficiency-enhancing than financial incentives. 
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Hunt Game 5, for instance, equilibrium (E, E) is payoff dominant, while equilibrium (S, S) is 
risk-dominant if  because in that case we have ab >2 )()()0()0( bababb −⋅−>−⋅− . 
Two differences between payoff dominance and the E-principle stand out, that is, the 
former criterion does not take into account (i) out of equilibrium payoffs and (ii) equity. With 
regard to risk dominance, however, the differences are much more subtle. It is a remarkable 
illustration of this that the data from Straub (1995), which is largely consistent with our model, 
is also much consistent with risk dominance: Subjects converged in most games in Straub 
(1995) to the risk-dominant equilibrium – however, risk dominance fails to explain much 
results in Haruvy and Stahl (2007). 
Indeed there is a close relation between risk dominance and the E-principle. To see this 
in some detail, consider again Table 1. Let 2111 aaL Er −= and  denote the row 
and column player’s loss from unilaterally deviating from the E-equilibrium, respectively -
1211 bbL
E
c −=
NE
rL ,  are analogously defined. Then thresholds (6) and (7) can be respectively rewritten 
as  
NE
cL
                              
E
r
NE
r
NE
r
LL
L
+
,        
E
c
NE
c
NE
c
LL
L
+
.  
We observe here, therefore, that coordination on the E-equilibrium becomes easier as 
E
rL  and  increase and as EcL NErL  and  decrease, that is, as the product NEcL ErL ·  of the 
losses from unilateral deviation from equilibrium (E, E) increases and that of (NE, NE) 
decreases. In other words, an increase in the risk dominance level of the E-equilibrium makes 
more likely that it is played. 
E
cL
Although the relation between risk dominance and the E-principle is somehow close, it 
is however important to stress the disparities. First, since risk dominance does not depend on 
social efficiency and equity, the E-equilibrium and the risk dominant one need not coincide. As 
an example of an equitable equilibrium which is not risk dominant, consider Game 15. (E, E) is 
the E-equilibrium if the inequity parameter δ is larger than 1/3, but (NE, NE) is the risk-
dominant equilibrium. Our model indicates that players should play (E, E) if ρ  is at least equal 
to 0.625 –as application of thresholds (6) and (7) proves. 
 
E NE 
E 30, 30 0, 0 
NE 0, 0 50, 20 
E NE 
E 80, 80 10, 70 
NE 70, 10 30, 30 
 
 
 
 
                        Game 15                                                               Game 16                               
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An example of a socially efficient equilibrium which is not risk dominant is equilibrium 
(E, E) of Game 16. Hypothesis 3 predicts that players will unequivocally play (E, E) if ρ  is at 
least equal to 2/3. Interestingly, Straub (1995) report that participants in Game 16 
predominantly choose action E. 
Second, and even if the E-equilibrium is risk dominant as well, it is crucial to stress that 
hypothesis 3 selects the E-equilibrium only for ‘large’ values of ρ , while it makes no precise 
prediction otherwise -in contrast, the risk dominance criterion makes no such distinction. If 
players had different beliefs about ρ  -i.e., if priors were not common-, this might be important. 
To illustrate this point, consider Game 17. Its E-equilibrium (E, E) is risk dominant and 
hypothesis 3 predicts play of E if both players believe that ρ  is higher than 0.47 –apply 
equation (6) or (7). On the contrary, a subject could choose NE if she thought that ρ  is lower 
than 0.47. Indeed, Keser and Vogt (2000) report that almost half of the subjects chose action 
NE and perhaps this could be explained by some heterogeneity in subjects’ beliefs.15 
Incidentally, this remark points out that eliciting beliefs about ρ  -e.g., by asking subjects what 
proportion of players find obvious an efficient and egalitarian equilibrium- could offer 
insightful information on how players coordinate.  
Another selection principle that appears in the literature is security –see for instance 
Van Huyck et al. (1990). Roughly speaking, any equilibrium is secure if the equilibrium actions 
maximize each player’s minimum possible payoffs (in the matrix that results after deletion of 
non-equilibrium actions). In contrast with the E-principle, security takes into account neither 
social efficiency nor equity. As a consequence, security selects equilibrium (NE, NE) in Game 
18, even when play of E (which according to our model is sure if ρ  is larger than 0.01) seems 
introspectively much more likely. In addition, the security principle does not provide a 
convincing explanation of why out of equilibrium payoffs affect coordination (for instance, 
security cannot explain why the level of efficient play differs from Game 13 to Game 14). 
 
E NE 
E 70, 70 5, 20 
NE 20, 5 50, 50 
E NE 
E 100, 100 0, 1 
NE 1, 0 1, 1 
 
 
 
                 Game 17                                                               Game 18                                               
3.2 Dominated Strategies and Coordination  
                                                 
15  Subjects in Keser and Vogt (2000) played Game 17 just once, and one could speculate that they 
might converge to the E-equilibrium if they played the game repeatedly and were thus allowed to 
learn the objective value of ρ  (assuming, of course, that ρ  is larger than 0.47).  
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Recall from expression (5) that the critical mass Eρ  characterizing hypothesis 3 is 
defined, for each game, as the minimal mass of E-types such that if all E-types move according 
to profile a E then no player finds optimal to deviate from a E, even if the non-E-types choose 
any other strategy with uniform probability. 
We did not exclude dominated strategies from this definition. Although we believe that 
this issue is largely an empirical matter (and the evidence from Cooper et al. (1990) or 
Crawford (1997) is in favor of our approach), there are at least two arguments to justify the 
inclusion of dominated strategies in this definition. First, much experimental evidence proves 
that numerous subjects do not only care about their own material payoff –see Camerer (2003) 
for a survey. Consequently, a player might choose a strategy that is dominated in monetary 
terms –i.e., a strategy that consistently gives a lower monetary payoff than another one, no 
matter what others do- because she expects to compensate the material loss with some 
psychological or emotional benefit. Second, the evidence also indicates that some subjects 
believe that others may play dominated strategies - with frequencies ranging from 20% to just 
over 80%, according to Crawford (1997, p. 11).  
One might think of alternative definitions of threshold Eρ  that exclusively allow for 
play of non-dominated strategies. To understand some of the consequences of this modeling 
choice consider Game 19, where strategy NE1 dominates strategy NE2, and Game 20, which is 
obtained from Game 19 just by deleting the dominated strategy NE2. Under hypothesis 3, the 
E-equilibrium (E, E) is the focal point of Game 19 if 
                      )20030(
2
)1(10)010(
2
)1(60 +⋅−+⋅≥+⋅−+⋅ ρρρρ ,  
that is, if ρ  is higher than 0.68. In contrast, if dominated strategies are assumed not to 
count for the computation of the critical mass Eρ , the E-equilibrium is focal in Game 19 if it 
happens to be focal in Game 20 as well, that is, if ρ  is higher than 0.29 – as one can confirm by 
applying either (6) or (7). In other words, if dominated strategies are assumed not to matter, 
coordination on the E-equilibrium of Game 19 is arguably a rather easy task, while the opposite 
is true otherwise. 
 
E NE1 NE2 
E 60, 60 10, 10 0, 0 
NE1 10, 10 30, 30 200, 0
NE2 0, 0 0, 200 40, 40
 E NE1 
E 60, 60 10, 10 
NE1 10, 10 30, 30 
 
 
 
  
                  Game 19                                                       Game 20 
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3.3 Coordination May Depend on the Number of Strategies Available 
One topic that seems to have received scarce systematic attention in the literature is how 
the sheer number of available strategies affects coordination. Given how the critical mass (5) is 
defined, this variable clearly plays a role in our model. We analyze its influence in a bit of 
detail by showing first that an increase in the number of strategies can sometimes facilitate 
coordination on the E-equilibrium. For that, consider two simplified versions of the Nash 
bargaining game (see 2.1). In the first one (Game 21), players can only demand $4, $5 or $6, 
while in the second one (Game 22) they can additionally demand either $1 or $9. 
 
$1 $4 $5 $6 $9 
$1 1, 1 1, 4 1, 5 1, 6 1, 9 
$4 4, 1 4, 4 4, 5 4, 6 0, 0 
$5 5, 1 5, 4 5, 5 0, 0 0, 0 
$6 6, 1 6, 4 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 
$9 9, 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 
 
 
 
 
 
  
             
$4 $5 $6 
$4 4, 4 4, 5 4, 6 
$5 5, 4 5, 5 0, 0 
$6 6, 4 0, 0 0, 0 
         Game 21                                                                Game 22     
Clearly, both games have a unique E-equilibrium, that is, the equal sharing. Further, 
direct application of expression (5) indicates that players should coordinate on the E-
equilibrium in Game 21 and 22 if ρ  is larger than 3/5 and 1/3, respectively. In other words, 
coordination is easier in Game 22, where players have five strategies available, than in Game 
21, where they have only three. The intuition here is that the best possible deviation from the E-
equilibrium –i.e., the $4 demand- becomes riskier as the number of strategies increase. 
This result can be easily generalized. For that, let m denote the number of available 
strategies in the Nash Bargaining game (to simplify the exposition, we consider a symmetric 
version of the game with an odd number of strategies), K the ‘E-demand’, and K-ε the largest 
possible demand among all demands smaller than K (K, ε > 0). Given this, expression (5) holds 
if  
 E)(m
)(mm
m
m
m
ρρρρρρ =−+
+≥⇔⋅+⋅−
−+⋅≥⋅−⋅−
−+⋅
3εK2
1ε-K2ε)-K(
2
)1()
1
1(ε)-K(K
2
)1(
1
)1(K . 
Partial differentiation then shows that the critical mass Eρ  decreases as m increases in 
the Nash Bargaining game, as we wanted to show (note also that coordination is facilitated as 
well if ε increases).   
We want to stress that this result need not extend to other games, as a simple example 
can confirm. In effect, consider Game 23, where column player’s strategies NE1 and NE2 are 
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undistinguishable. Our model predicts that both players will choose E if ρ  is larger than 2/7 
and, as the reader can easily confirm, this would hold as well if we added another strategy NE3 
undistinguishable from NE1 and NE2. To put it like that, the addition of redundant strategies is 
immaterial for coordination because it does affect the level of risk associated to the play of the 
E-equilibrium. Interestingly, this contrasts with the prediction given by bounded rationality 
models of levels of reasoning (Stahl and Wilson, 1995). For instance, a level-1 row player 
should move E in Game 23, given her beliefs that the column player is a level-0 type who 
uniformly randomize among any strategy; but she should choose NE if an undistinguishable 
strategy NE3 was added. 
 
 
 
 
E NE1 NE2 
E 7, 7 0,0 0, 0 
NE 2, 0 2, 1 2, 1 
      Game 23 
3.4 Multiple player games 
We finish this section by making a brief reference to multiple player games. Extending 
the model to n-player, normal-form games is direct as it just suffices to redefine in an obvious 
manner the threshold prior Eρ  so that E-types do not find optimal to deviate from the E-
equilibrium if Eρρ ≥  and any non-E-player is expected to randomize uniformly among all 
non-E-actions. 
One class of multiple player games that have received much attention in the 
experimental literature are order-statistic games, where n players simultaneously choose a 
number within certain range, and any player’s payoff depends negatively on the distance 
between her choice and a particular statistic of others’ choices, like the median or the 
minimum. An example of the Minimum (or Weak-Link) game could be a group of people who 
agreed to meet at a certain place at a certain time and who can independently choose whether 
they arrive punctual: Everybody could prefer the punctual equilibrium, but punctual players 
lose if at least one person arrives late. Seminal experimental papers are Van Huyck et al. (1990, 
1991) –consult Camerer (2003) and Devetag and Ortmann (forthcoming) for a review of the 
literature. 
Order-statistic games are similar to Stag Hunt in that there is usually a tension between 
the efficient equilibrium and the secure one –in fact, Stag Hunt is an extremely simple version 
of the Minimum game. For this reason, many of the insights of our model for Stag Hunt also 
hold here: Coordination on the E-equilibrium is facilitated as it becomes more attractive 
(consistent with the evidence reported in Brandts and Cooper, 2005), and as out of equilibrium 
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payoffs are conveniently varied (consistent with Van Huyck et al., 1990). In our prior example, 
everybody arrives on time if the proportion of people who find prominent the punctual 
equilibrium (maybe because they feel that arriving punctual is their moral duty) is ‘large 
enough’. 
To finish, this class of games raise and interesting question, that is, should an increase in 
the number of players hinder coordination? To think about this issue, consider the Stag Hunt 
game with n players: Each player chooses between actions E and S; she gets a sure payoff of b 
if she moves S, a payoff of a (a > b) if all players move E, and 0 if she moves E and at least 
one player moves S.  
Obviously, all players move E in the unique E-equilibrium, and hypothesis 3 indicates 
that this is the unique focal point only if En
nn
a
bba ρρρρ =≥⇔≥⋅−+⋅ 0)1( . Since Eρ  
depends positively on n (observe that b /a <1) it follows that coordination on the E-equilibrium 
in the Stag Hunt becomes more complicated as n increases. This seems consistent with the 
evidence reported by Van Huyck et al. (1990) for the Weak-Link game and it is moreover 
rather intuitive: The efficient choice gets riskier as the number of players increase.  
4. Conclusion and Extensions 
This paper develops a theory based on the idea that the fairest equilibrium of a game –in 
case a unique one exists- is the obvious or prominent solution for many players, but also that 
players may disagree on what they deem fair, or alternatively that some players may not find 
obvious at all a fair equilibrium. We show the model to be consistent with abundant 
experimental evidence when we assume that some players consider efficiency and equity as 
necessary ingredients of fairness. 
We argue that coordination between anonymous agents is relatively easy when it is 
common knowledge that ‘enough’ agents agree on the existence of a unique fair manner to 
play. On the contrary, coordination is delicate and might fail when there exist multiple fair 
equilibria or when there is just one fair equilibrium but the mass of players who agree on its 
obviousness is ‘small’. 
We can mention a number of lessons from this. First, any team or group of people 
engaged in a joint task should make sure that most of them agree on a set of non-ambiguous 
normative values. Second, agents’ should be informed about other agents’ payoffs to facilitate 
the emergence of an obvious pattern of behavior. Third, teams should introduce additional 
coordination mechanisms like pre-play talk or the use of leaders when there exist multiple fair 
equilibria. Fourth, side payoffs conveniently altering either equilibrium or non-equilibrium 
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payoffs may reduce the risk associated with play of the fair equilibrium and hence increase 
coordination, even if they do not affect the set of equilibria.  
We believe that our model is more consistent with the available evidence on 
coordination that other selection criteria. Payoff dominance fails because it does not take into 
account that equity matters for making an equilibrium focal and because it is not consistent 
with the fact that out of equilibrium payoffs affect coordination. Risk dominance, although 
closely linked to our criterion, fails to take into account equity and efficiency. 
One can think of a number of extensions which could be easily introduced. To start, an 
obvious one concerns extensive form games. Unfortunately, extending the model to this class 
of games is not direct. From our point of view, the main problem is introducing a parsimonious 
and at the same time empirically valid measure of the risk associated to playing the E-
equilibrium. As another possible extension, one could relax the assumption of risk neutrality 
and assume instead prospect theory - Kahneman and Tversky (1979)- to investigate how 
negative payoffs may affect coordination.  
Further, one might think of additional focal principles complementing the E-principle. 
For instance, our societies have conventions of the type ‘first come, first served’ that could help 
players to coordinate -for a particular example, see Sugden (1989). More precisely, we think of 
a focal principle which could be called the ‘priority principle’ and that would complement 
hypothesis 3 when there exist multiple E-equilibria and an indisputably first (in a chronological 
sense) mover F: Any E-equilibrium that gives F the highest possible payoff is focal if the mass 
of E-types is large enough (in the sense of hypothesis 3). 
We can illustrate this idea with one example. We noted before that our model was 
undetermined in the Battle of the Sexes (Game 11) because there were two E-equilibria. The 
priority principle does not help players to coordinate if they chose at the same time because 
there is no clear first mover in this case. In an interesting variation of the game, however, one 
player moves at time t whereas the other moves at time t+1 without being informed of the other 
player’s choice. In this case, it is clear that the E-equilibrium that gives the highest payoff to 
the first mover is the unique focal point if ρ  is larger than b/(a + b). Hence, coordination 
seems more likely here than in the standard, ‘truly simultaneous’ version, a prediction 
supported by the evidence surveyed in Camerer (2003, pp. 365-7). 
One important issue concerns communication. People sometimes believe that 
coordination mainly succeeds because agents are able to communicate their intentions and 
agree on a manner to do things. Although this is clearly an oversimplification,16 abundant 
                                                 
16 People often coordinate even if communication is unavailable (think of car drivers coordinating on 
which side of the road to drive in) or very costly –e.g., much time would be wasted if team workers 
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experimental evidence confirms that communication often fosters coordination on efficient 
equilibria –see, for instance, Cooper et al. (1992), and Duffy and Feltovich (2002). In a related 
work (…), we study this phenomenon.  
To finish, our model predicts that an E-equilibrium is sure to be played if there is a 
critical mass of E-types, but it is undetermined otherwise. Our suggestion is that models of 
bounded rationality –or, more precisely, hybrid models combining sophisticated Nash players 
and agents with limited reasoning abilities- are likely candidates to explain behaviour in this 
case.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
had to talk prior to starting any common effort. Further, communication raises a key question, that 
is, why people should believe others’ announcements and express sincerely their intentions.  
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